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BARRING SLAYERS' ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
VIRGINIA: A PROPOSED STATUTE
The social interest served by refusing to permit the criminal to profit by his
crime is greater than that served by the preservation and enforcement of legal
rights of ownership.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The above passage by Justice Benjamin Cardozo clearly reflects the age-
old maxim of the common law, Nullus commodurn capere potest de injuria
sua propria, which expounds the philosophy that no individual shall profit
from his own wrong. The present Virginia statute concerning homicide and
succession to property2 was enacted by the legislature to reflect this com-
mon law policy. However, because of the very narrow scope of the statute
and the requirement that it be strictly construed, it is presently inadequate
to respond to many of the issues facing our judges in Virginia. Section 64.1-
18 of the Virginia Code states that no convicted murderer shall be allowed
to acquire any interest in the estate of the person he murders either by
descent or distribution or by will, nor shall he be allowed to receive any
payment on a life insurance policy covering the victim's life.' This statute
covers only a very limited number of factual situations and is presently
inadequate to respond to the variety of cases which arise, as illustrated by
the following approach taken by the Circuit Court of Russell County:
The sole question before the Court in this case is whether or not a husband
who is convicted of murder in the death of his wife may take the entirety
under a survivorship deed. The Court is of the opinion that Section 64.1-18
of the Code of Virginia must be strictly construed and applies only to prop-
erty acquired by descent, distribution, will or under an insurance policy.
The Court must agree with the contention of the complainant that
property rights cannot be taken from an individual who is legally entitled to
1. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43 (1921).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
[When homicide to bar acquisition of estate or proceeds of life insurance policy.]
No person shall acquire by descent or distribution or by will any interest in the estate
of another, nor receive any payment under any policy of life insurance upon the life of
another, for whose death such person has been convicted of murder. In such event
should any life insurance be payable, then it shall be paid as if such person predeceased
the insured to such other person as may be named in the policy, or if no such other
person is named, then to the estate of the insured. Any insurer making payment
according to the terms of its policy or contract shall not be subjected to additional
liability by the terms of this section if such payment is made without notice of circum-
stances bringing it within the provisions of this section.
3. Id.
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it [sic] because he violates a public policy, even if that public policy is the
wilful murder of one spouse by the other.'
The court in that case was faced with a factual situation concerning survi-
vorship property which the statute did not cover. Because it was limited
by a narrow construction of section 64.1-18, the court was unable to reflect
the general policy of the statute, which is not to allow a slayer to acquire
property from one whom he kills. Generally, cases which have allowed a
slayer to retain his ill-gotten bounty have been decided by courts which
reasoned that statutes of intestate succession and statutes of wills were
exclusive and that courts should not legislate in the absence of a statutory
provision.' Thus, Virginia courts are faced with an inapplicable and inade-
quate statute in many instances,6 and the result is a strict construction of
common law property rights which produces results totally contradictory
to the policy that no man shall profit by his own wrong.
Two cases presently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Virignia demon-
strate the need for statutory expression to cover slayings arising in a ten-
ancy by the entirety relationship.7 The legal trend across the country, both
4. Sykes v. Shelia, mem. op. (Cir. Ct. of Russell County, Va. 1975) (emphasis added). In
this unreported decision, the court referred to an earlier Virginia case, Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192
Va. 337, 64 S.E.2d 809 (1951), in making the statement that "[t]his Court . . .does not
subscribe to the righteousness of the murderer's legal status but this is a Court of law and
not a theological institution." Thus, the courts in Blanks and Sykes reasoned that because
the statute was designed to be a penal statute, it must be strictly construed. The result in
Sykes was to allow a spouse convicted of murder to acquire property that he held with his
wife under a survivorship deed. In Blanks, the court allowed a son who had murdered his
father to take a remainder which had vested in the son under his mother's will. The remainder
was to have followed the father's life estate. In addition to the life estate, the father also held
a general power of appointment under his wife's will which provided that in default of
appointment, the property would pass to the life tenant's issue. The court in Blanks stated
the following:
The reason the son is allowed the benefit of the shortened life estate is because this
statute does not prohibit it. ...
It is true that the reprehensible act of the appellant accelerated the falling in of his
father's life estate and enriched him by vesting in him the immediate usufruct from
the estate which normally he could not expect until sometime in the future, if at all.
However, this does not result in his acquiring any interest in the estate of his father,
which is all that is denied him by the terms of Section 64-18 of the Code.
192 Va. at 342-43 (emphasis added).
5. Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C. L. Rav. 175, 186 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Bolich].
6. Sundin v. Klein, No. 790200 (Sup. Ct. of Va., writ granted June 5, 1979); Jackson v.
Morrison, No. 781405 (Sup. Ct. of Va., writ granted Feb. 2, 1979); Sykes v. Shelia, mem. op.
(Cir. Ct. of Russell County, Va. 1975); Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 64 S.E.2d 809 (1951).
7. Jackson v. Morrison, No. 781405 (Sup. Ct. of Va., writ granted Feb. 2, 1979); Sundin v.
Klein, No. 790200 (Sup. Ct. of Va., writ granted June 5, 1979). In Jackson v. Morrison, the
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legislative and judicial, is to prohibit the murderer from profiting by his
own wrong." The Virginia General Assembly should address this problem
before further injustices are inflicted upon innocent heirs or devisees of
slain victims who are deprived of their rights merely because of an inade-
quate statute which does not address their problem.
The deficiency of the Virginia statute is not merely its failure to recog-
nize acquisition of survivorship property, but rather its failure to address
certain contingencies. What will happen if the slayer is convicted of man-
slaughter rather than murder? Perhaps, the slayer may commit suicide
prior to a conviction.9 A situation might arise in which the slayer may have
sold his newly acquired property to a bona fide purchaser. Or perhaps, the
slaying was done in self-defense or by an insane person. These are merely
a few of the many factual situations which could arise.
Although the present statute is inadequate to provide a remedy at law
in all cases, this does not mean that a remedy is unavailable. In order to
prevent unjust enrichment of the slayer, courts of equity could impose a
constructive trust to prevent the slayer from profiting from his wrongful
act, as favored by the authors of the Restatement of Restitution."0 The
constructive trust has two basic advantages:
The first is that it placates those favoring a literal construction of statutes.
A constructive trust "avoids the dubious practice of reading implied excep-
husband, Buddy C. Morrison, murdered his wife, and as a result, obtained certain property
located in Alexandria, Virginia, which had been deeded to husband and wife as tenants by
the entirety with common law rights of survivorship. The trial court sustained a demurrer in
favor of the husband stating:
In the absence of a statute, land held by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties
passes, upon the death of either spouse, to the survivor absolutely.
Section 64.1-18 of the Code is not applicable since no estate had passed by will, descent
or distribution and life insurance proceeds are not involved.
Petition for appeal at 2, No. 781405 (Sup. Ct. of Va., filed Sept. 29, 1978). In Sundin, a
husband was convicted of second degree murder of his wife. The Circuit Court of Accomack
County, Virginia, held that the property interest of the wife passed by survivorship to the
husband and declared him to be the fee simple owner of real property which the couple had
held as tenants by the entirety with right of survivorship at common law. No. 790200 (Sup.
Ct. of Va., writ granted June 5, 1979).
8. Bolich, supra note 5, at 186.
9. Section 64.1-18 requires a conviction of murder before the statute will apply.
10. RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION §§ 187-89 (1937). Under Comment (a) of § 187 at 765, the
following statement appears: "The rules stated in this Section are applicable although the
Statute of Wills or the Statute of Descent and Distribution makes no provision for the
situation where the devisee or legatee or heir or next of kin kills the decedent." The following
statement advocating the propriety of establishing a constructive trust was made in Jackson
v. Morrison, supra note 6, Petition for Appeal at 5: "[Ilt is no defense to plead that no statute
applies to deprive one of such a gain from a heinous murder."
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tions into a statute [because] the court is not making an exception to the
provisions of the statutes, but is merely compelling the murderer to surrender
the profits of his crime ... .
The second advantage ...is that it protects the rights of one who has
purchased property in good faith from the murdering heir, since a bona fide
purchaser of the legal title is not subject to the constructive trust."
It should be noted, however, that there may be problems involved in using
the constructive trust in the case of intestate succession. Since the con-
structive trust should be imposed only in favor of one who has been un-
justly deprived of property, it has been suggested that there can be no
cestui que trust in the case of intestate succession, as the other heirs cannot
contend that they were deprived of property by the slayer's act, because
they would not have taken it anyway." Although the constructive trust is
a certain way to prevent the wrongdoer from holding the legal right to
property which he ought not in good faith hold, there are uncertainties as
to the amount of property to which the constructive trust will attach,
especially in the area of survivorship property. 3 Until the General Assem-
bly changes section 64.1-18, the constructive trust certainly is more equita-
ble than allowing the murderer or those to whom he conveys his interest
to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the innocent victim's successors
in 'interest.
It is the purpose of this comment to suggest a statutory solution to meet
the inadequacies of section 64.1-18. In 1936, Professor John W. Wade pro-
posed a model act which he believed would cover almost all potential areas
concerning the acquisition of property by one who had wilfully killed an-
other. It is the opinion of this writer that Professor Wade's model statute,
with some minor modifications, would offer the best and most comprehen-
sive solution to the inadequacies inherent in section 64.1-18. The Uniform
Probate Code, which was approved by the National Conference on Uniform
State Laws and by the American Bar Association in August, 1969, also
11. McGovern, Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REv. 65, 68-69 (1969),
quoting G. BOGERT, TRusTs § 478 (2d ed. 1960).
12. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARv. L. Rav. 715, 719 n.18 (1936). However, the note further states that an argument in favor
of the constructive trust could be made by heirs in cases of intestate succession, who could
suggest that there was a possibility that the decedent might have survived the slayer, and,
in that case, the property which the slayer acquired would then have passed to them. Id.
13. This problem will be discussed in Section 5 of this comment.
14. WADE, supra note 12, at 753. Professor Wade's suggested statute [hereinafter cited as
WADE Statute] was adopted by Pennslyvania in 1941, 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 8801 to
8815 (Purdon 1975), and was "substantially followed" by the Special Drafting Committee for




suggests a model statute which, although not as comprehensive, is much
shorter and more concise than Professor Wade's statute. In the remainder
of this comment, a proposed statutory solution will be suggested as an
alternative to the Virginia statute by choosing the best provisions from
each of these model acts. An act will be presented section by section
together with comments explaining why this writer believes the suggested
provisions will prevent slayers from taking advantage of their own wrongful
acts.
II. PROPOSED STATUTE
SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF TERMS. As used in this section:
(1) "Slayer" shall mean any person who participates, either as a princi-
pal or as an accessory before the fact, in the wilful and unlawful killing of
any other person.
(2) "Decedent" shall mean any person whose life is so taken.
(3) "Property" shall include any real and personal property and any
right or interest therein.' 5
The current Virginia statute requires a conviction of murder before the
slayer will be precluded from acquiring property from the decedent."8 The
Uniform Probate Code requires that a killing be done "feloniously and
intentionally."" It is recommended by this writer that the words "wilful
and unlawful" be used in determining the degree of wrongfulness required
before the slayer will be barred from acquiring any property rights. "This
duality of requirement excludes any killing by a noncriminal act such as
mere negligence, a homicide which was justifiable or excusable or one
committed while the slayer was insane, and by any non-wilful crime, in-
cluding involuntary manslaughter."'" Thus, an intentional criminal homi-
cide such as voluntary manslaughter would bar acquisition; whereas slay-
ings done in self-defense or by accident or by an insane person, or as the
result of mere negligence, or involuntary manslaughter would be excluded
from this section. It is important to understand why "felonious killing" as
suggested by the UPC would not be appropriate in Virginia. The following
language is used in the Virginia statute in determining which homicides
are felonies: "Any person who commits capital murder, murder of the first
degree, murder of the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, or involun-
15. WADE Statute, §'1 at 753; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8801 (Purdon 1975).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
17. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (a) (5th ed. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as the UPC].
18. Note, Decedents' Estates-Forfeitures of Property Rights by Slayers, 12 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 448, 451 (1976), quoting Bolich, supra note 5, at 193.
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tary manslaughter, shall be guilty of a felony."'" Thus, while use of the
word "wilful" would exclude involuntary manslaughter in Virginia, if
"felonious" were used, this would cause all involuntary manslaughter cases
to be included. It is interesting to note the following position of the Re-
statement of Restitution in its determination as to when the principles of
the constructive trust shall apply: "They are not applicable where the
slayer was guilty only of manslaughter."20 It is also noteworthy that many
courts which operate under common law principles, in the absence of a
controlling statute, have also concluded that an intentional killing, albeit
without premeditation, is a bar.'
The words "either as a principal or as an accessory before the fact" have
been added to include conspiiators or those who take or procure the taking
of the life of another individual. The UPC does not include this provision
and only requires a "felonious and intentional killing."2 It would seem
wiser to include accessories or conspirators in this section; otherwise they
would be able to avoid the provisions of this section merely by hiring
another person to slay the decedent for them.
There are several reasons for eliminating the requirement of a conviction
which presently exists under section 64.1-18. Suppose the slayer has not
been convicted and never will be convicted because he committed suicide
shortly after the slaying. Since conviction would be impossible, the entire
purpose of the statute would be avoided for the benefit of the slayer's
successors in interest. In the comments on the application of the construc-
tive trust, the Restatement of Restitution states the following:
The rules stated in this Section are applicable although the person acquir-
ing the property has not been convicted of murder in a criminal proceeding.
Thus, it is applicable although the murderer commits suicide before any
criminal proceeding is brought against him. In such a case the person who
acquires the murderer's estate on his death, not being a bona fide purchaser,
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-30 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (emphasis added). See the annotations to §
64.1-18 where it is stated that this "section does not extend to voluntary manslaughter." Life
Ins. Co. of Va. v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Va. 1962).
20. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187, comment e (1937).
21. McGovern, supra note 11, at 91.
22. UPC § 2-803(a). The West Virginia statute actually uses the word "conspiracy":
No person who has been convicted of feloniously killing another, or of conspiracy in
the killing of another, shall take or acquire any money or property, real or personal, or
interest therein, from the one killed or conspired against, either by descent and distri-
bution, or by will, or by any policy or certificate of insurance, or otherwise. ...
W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2 (1966).
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is, like the murderer himself before his death, chargeable as constructive
trustee.Y
The case of Smith v. Greenberg4 points out the disastrous effect the re-
quirement of conviction has upon disposition of the property. In that case,
after killing his wife and daughter, the husband committed suicide. Al-
though he was prohibited from receiving proceeds as a beneficiary of their
life insurance policies, he was allowed to inherit from them because the
statute barred inheritance by one "convicted of murder." It is anticipated
that this proposed section will cover the present deficiencies in section
64.1-18 and will fulfill the requirements of the almost universal rule that
no man shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong: Ex turpi causa oritus
non actio.2
SECTION 2. SLAYER NOT TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF SLAYING.
Neither the slayer nor any person claiming through him shall in any way
acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result of the death of
the decedent, but such property shall pass as provided in the sections
following. 6
Professor Wade included this section with its intentionally broad lan-
guage "to cover every situation that may arise,"" and to provide how the
property shall pass. This section could be considered optional.
SECTION 3. DESCENT, DISTRIBUTION, DOWER, CURTESY, AND STATUTORY
RIGHTS AS SURVIVOR. The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the
decedent as to property which would have passed from the estate of the
decedent to the slayer under the statutes of descent and distribution or
have been acquired by dower, by curtesy, or by statutory right as surviving
spouse32
According to Professor Wade, "[i]t is here that a staute is needed most
"29 Although section 64.1-18 addresses the property interests under
the statutes of descent and distribution, the present statute makes no
reference to marital rights.
23. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187, comment f (1937). For the cases where as a result
of the suicide of the slayer his heirs acquired the property, see Hogg v. Whitham, 120 Kan.
341, 242 P. 1021 (1926); In re Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (1934). See also Wade,
supra note 12, at 723 n.34.
24. 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950).
25. Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 412 (E.D. Va. 1962).
26. WADE Statute, § 2 at 724; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8802 (Purdon 1975). The North
Carolina statute omitted this provision.
27. Wade, supra note 12, at 724.
28. WADE Statute, § 3 at 724-25; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8803 (Purdon 1975).
29. Wade, supra note 12, at 725.
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At this point, reference will be made to provisions against forfeiture or
corruption of blood as affecting the constitutionality of the entire proposed
statute. "No suicide, nor attainder of felony, shall work a corruption of
blood or forfeiture of estate."3 Normally, then, it would appear to be
unconstitutional to take away from a slayer any property interest which
he already has. But it may be argued that "[t]here can be no forfeiture
of that which the murderer never had."3' This argument is equally applica-
ble in the area of marital rights as it is in the area of jointly held property.
The court is not taking away from the slayer an estate which he has already
acquired, but "is simply preventing him from acquiring property in an unau-
thorized and unlawful way, i.e., by murder. It takes nothing from him but
simply says you cannot acquire property in this way." And if this course may
be taken by a court, obviously the legislature may provide that property
cannot be acquired through a wilful and unlawful slaying.32
Since statutory rights of dower and curtesy are considered inchoate and
thus subject to being abolished or changed, there seems to be no problem
of unconstitutionality. Thus, "no property is taken from the slayer; he is
merely prevented from getting property by killing someone-a salutary
moral principle and crime deterrent. '33
SECTION 4. DEVISE OR LEGACY. The slayer shall be deemed to have prede-
ceased the decedent as to property which would have passed to the slayer
by devise or legacy from the decedent, except that section 64.1-64, prevent-
ing lapse of devise or legacies when the person named in the will dies before
the testator, shall not apply.34
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-4 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Professor Wade notes, however, that statutes
of this sort were passed in order to prevent forfeiture to the state. Thus, if the property goes
to another person, then there is no forfeiture. Wade, supra note 12, at 720 n.21.
31. Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1955).
32. Wade, supra note 12, at 720.
33. Bolich, supra note 5, at 188. See generally: Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d
699 (1955); Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678 (1918); Colton v. Wade, 32
Del.Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (1951). The RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION takes the following posi-
tion:
Where a wife murders her husband, she is not entitled to dower in his land. The mere
fact that she had an inchoate right of dower prior to the murder is not a sufficient
reason for permitting her to claim dower on his death, since if she had not survived
him she would not have been entitled to dower, and it is only by murder that she made
sure of surviving him. Similarly, a husband who murders his wife is not entitled to
curtesy. So also, where one spouse murders the other the surviving spouse is not
entitled to a statutory distributive share of the estate of the deceased spouse; and this
is true even though by statute a surviving spouse cannot be deprived of the statutory
share by the will of the deceased spouse.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187, comment j (1937).
34. WADE Statute, § 4 at 727; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-64 (Supp. 1979).
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Basically property will be disposed of under this section in the same
manner as in section 3; however, this section provides for Virginia's anti-
lapse statute.3 5 If the anti-lapse statute had not been expressly held inappl-
icable, it would be possible for property to be acquired by the individuals
claiming under the slayer. Professor Wade does qualify this by saying that
"the heirs or next of kin of the slayer may claim the property if they are
entitled to it iii their own right, but they cannot claim through an ancestor
who has disqualified himself by his wrong."3
SECTION 5. TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY.
This is perhaps the most difficult area in which to propose a statutory
solution, as well as the most important area in which a solution is needed.
There has been a split of authority across the country as to the particular
solution, and the three broad categories of how property has been disposed
of are as follows: (1) The slayer acquires the entire estate; (2) The slayer
acquires less than the entire estate; (3) The slayer acquires nothing. 7 As
mentioned earlier, the question of disposition of tenancy by the entirety
property is presently on appeal before the Supreme Court of Virginia in
the case of Jackson v. Morrison." Perhaps defendant's counsel in Jackson
expressed the difficulty the court will face when deciding how to deal with
the problem when he stated the following:
Courts in jurisdictions where it is held that the surviving spouse did not
acquire the entirety property in fee simple then are required to determine
whether the survivor:
(a) Takes no part of the property
(b) Becomes a tenant in common
(c) Takes a life estate
(d) Receives the income from the property for his lifetime-in trust
(e) Receives a non-assignable life estate with remainder to the dece-
dent's estate
(f) Receives a life estate in one half of the property and the other half
and all remainder interests going to the decedent's estate, or
(g) Is entitled. . . to a commuted value of the net income from one
half of the property for his life expectancy.39
The Restatement of Restitution states that "[wihere two persons have an
interest in property and the interest of one of them is enlarged by his
murder of the other, to the extent to which it is enlarged he holds it upon
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-64 (Supp. 1979).
36. Wade, supra note 12, at 727.
37. Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1140 (1972).
38. No. 781405 (Sup. Ct. of Va., filed Sept. 29, 1978).
39. Id., Brief in Opposition at 3-4.
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a constructive trust for the estate of the other,"" thus ascribing to the view
that everything but the slayer's life interest will go to the victim's estate.
Perhaps the difficulty is due to the common law fiction of unity of person
in husband and wife, and the fact that, unlike joint tenancy property,
neither spouse is able to extinguish the other's survivorship rights by sever-
ance. It is further complicated by the constitutional problem of forfeiture,
because the slayer already has a property interest during his life. "The
solution must therefore not take away from the slayer any property interest
which he already has, but at the same time it should not allow him to
acquire any additional interest as a result of the death of the decedent.",
In joint tenancy property, as well as tenancy by the entirety property, it
would appear that an implied condition of the contract or deed is that
neither party will try to acquire the other's interest through killing the
other party. Thus, the survivorship incident of jointly held property
"presupposes that the death of either [party] will be in the natural course
of events and that it will not be generated by either tenant murdering the
other.""2
It is also interesting to note that even though it was stated earlier that
some courts have allowed the slayer to acquire the entire estate, these cases
were decided over twenty years ago.4" The modern trend appears to be that
courts will not turn their backs on the policy of preventing one from profit-
ing from his own wrong, but rather they will divest the slayer of at least a
portion of the property which had formerly been held in a tenancy by the
entirety with the decedent.4
Rather than suggesting one section on tenancy by the entirety for the
proposed statute, this writer feels that it would be wiser to offer three
alternatives and to let the reader decide for himself which seems to be the
most logical, equitable, and practical solution. Each alternative would
appear to be workable; however, the decision as to the best choice most
likely will involve individual moral considerations.
(ALTERNATIVE A.) SECTION 5. TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY. One half of the
property held by the slayer and the decedent shall pass upon the death of
40. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188 (1937).
41. Wade, supra note 12, at 728.
42. Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699, 705 (1955).
43. Wyckoff v. Clark, 77 Pa. D. & C. 249, 41 Luzerne Leg. Reg. R 371 (1951); In re Smith
Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 757, 42 Del. Co. 193, 5 Fiduciary R. 328 (1941); Hamer v. Kinnan,
16 Pa. D. & C. 395 (1931); Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108
(1907).
44. Jackson v. Morrison, No. 781405 (Sup. Ct. of Va., writ granted Feb. 2, 1979), Petition
for Appeal at 8.
260 [Vol. 14:251
BARRING SLAYERS' RIGHTS
the decedent to his estate, and the other half shall be held by the slayer
during his life subject to pass upon his death to the estate of the decedent.,5
Professor Wade, in proposing this solution, assumes that the decedent
would have outlived the slayer, thus resolving all doubts in favor of the
decedent as opposed to the slayer who deprived the decedent of all chances
of surviving. For this reason, the heirs of the slayer are totally deprived of
acquiring any of this property through him. The phraseology "subject to
pass upon his death to the estate of the decedent" is employed to indicate
that the slayer is not free to alienate the property.46
(ALTERNATIVE B.) SECION 5. TENANcIES BY THE ENTIRETY. As to property
held by the slayer and the decedent as tenants by the entirety, the result-
ing death of the decedent caused by the slayer thereby effects a severance
of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as
his property and the slayer has no rights of survivorship 7
This is the position of the UPC, causing a severance in the property
whereby the slayer and the decedent's estate become tenants in common
in the property formerly held as a tenancy by the entirety. A recent Florida
case"6 used this theory in an equitable and novel approach. In that case,
the husband had killed his wife and entered a plea of guilty to manslaugh-
ter. The Florida Probate Code provided that the convicted murderer of a
decedent could not inherit from the decedent. 9 The statute was held in-
applicable not only because the husband was not convicted of murder, but
also because property held as an estate by the entirety is not an asset of a
deceased tenant's estate. Although the statute was inapplicable, the Su-
preme Court of Florida relied on two earlier decisions" in subscribing "to
the fundamental principle of equity that 'no one shall be permitted to
profit by his own fraud, or take advantage of his own wrong, or found any
claim upon his own iniquity, or profit by his own crime,' ",' and held that
the estate was severed by the "willful, felonious act of one spouse which
results in the death of the other."5 Thus, the interest of the deceased
spouse was to be treated as if it had been held by the spouses as tenants
in common.
45. WADE Statute, § 5 at 728; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8805 (Purdon 1975).
46. Wade, supra note 12, at 730. See Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
47. UPC § 2-803(b).
48. In re Estate of Nunnelley, 343 So.2d 657 (Fla. App. 1977).
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West 1976).
50. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Hogan v. Martin, 52 So.2d 806 (Fla.
1951).
51. In re Estate of Nunnelley, 343 So.2d at 658 (Fla. 1977).
52. Id.
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Although in a tenancy by the entirety there can be no unilateral sever-
ance by either party, some courts have allowed a severance and have
divided land equally between the slayer and the decedent's estate relying
on an analogy to divorce, which transforms a tenancy by the entirety into
a tenancy in common.53 Thus, it is apparent that Alternatives A and B are
mutually exclusive since the constructive trust theory "requires that the
property pass to the survivor as if the interest had not been severed."54
(ALTERNATIVE C) SECTION 5. TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY. As to property
held by the slayer and the decedent as tenants by the entirety, the slayer
shall be treated as having predeceased the decedent, and the entire prop-
erty shall pass to the estate of the decedent.
This alternative is perhaps the most equitable solution in depriving the
slayer of all of his rights, but it could run into opposition on a constitu-
tional basis since it deprives the slayer of his lifetime income to the prop-
erty, a right which was not acquired by the unlawful act. However, it can
be just as easily argued that the implied condition of the contract was that
death would result from natural causes. This alternative would be most
appropriate in situations where the slayer committed suicide immediately
following the slaying of the spouse."
SECTION 6. JOINT TENANTS, JOINT OWNERS, AND JOINT OBLIGEES.
In discussing property held in joint tenancy, the same basic approach
will be taken, because the same three approaches appear to be taken as to
disposition of the property: (1) The slayer acquires the entire estate; (2)
The slayer acquires less than the entire estate; (3) The slayer acquires
nothing." Three alternative solutions again will be proposed. The word
"joint" will be used in a technical sense implying that there are rights of
survivorship. Furthermore, the use of the words "joint owners" and "joint
obligees" shall imply that joint and multiple-party accounts in banks,
savings and loan associations, credit unions and other institutions, and any
other form of co-ownership with survivorship incidents shall be included. 57
No statute will be suggested which would allow the slayer to acquire the
entire estate. It appears that most of the cases which allowed the killer to
acquire the entire jointly-held property did so because there was no appli-
' 53. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 237
Ind. 130, 144 N.E.2d 710 (1957).
54. In re Estate of Nunnelley, 343 So.2d at 658 n.1 (Fla. 1977).
55. See Welch v. Welch, 252 A.2d 131 (Del. Ch. 1969); In re Pinnock's Estate, 83 Misc.2d
233, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1975); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (1918).
56. Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1148-57 (1972).
57. Wade, supra note 12, at 732. UPC § 2-803(b).
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cable statute to prevent that from occurring. These courts have held that
"[iln the absence of a statute declaring that public policy requires the
surviving joint tenant to relinquish interests in property,. . . [the courts
will be] reluctant to declare such policy." 8 Thus, these cases merely show
the need for an appropriate statute to cover the problem.
(ALTERNATIVE A) SECTION 6. JOINT TENANTS, JOINT OWNERS, AND JOINT
OBLIGEES.
(a) One half of any property held by the slayer and the decedent as joint
tenants, joint owners, or joint obligees shall pass upon the death of the
decedent to his estate, and the other half shall pass to his estate upon the
death of the slayer; unless the slayer obtains a separation or severance of
the property or a decree granting partition.
(b) As to property held jointly by three or more persons, including the
slayer and decedent, any enrichment which would have accrued to the
slayer as a result of the death of the decedent shall pass to the estate of
the decedent. If the slayer becomes the final survivor, one half of the
property shall immediately pass to the estate of the decedent, and the
other half shall pass to his estate upon the death of the slayer, unless the
slayer obtains a separation or severance of the property or a decree granting
partition.
(c) The provisions of this Section shall not affect any enforceable agree-
ment between the parties or any trust arising because a greater proportion
of the property has been contributed by one party than by the other. 5'
Professor Wade noted that the major distinction between sections 5 and
6 was the fact that "[a] single tenant by the entirety cannot alienate his
interest or compel a division of the property, but a joint tenant or joint
obligee can."'" He indicates that the slayer's interest in the property and
the right to have it severed or separated should neither be taken from the
slayer nor caused to be forfeited. Thus, if the slayer has not severed the
property at the time of his death, the presumption will be that the slayer
would have predeceased the decedent, and the rest of the property will go
to the decedent's estate.'
Subsection (b) covers the situation of multiple joint tenants or joint
obligees. A simple example of this provision would be that if there were
58. Jackson v. Morrison, No. 781405 (Sup. Ct. of Va., writ granted Feb. 2, 1979), Brief in
Opposition at Z. See generally: Shuman v. Schick, 95 Ohio App. 413, 120 N.E.2d 330 (1953);
Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
59. WADE Statute, § 6 at 732; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8806 (Purdon 1975).
60. Wade, supra note 12, at 733.
61. Wade, supra note 12, at 733-74.
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three joint tenants, on the death of the decedent a one-sixth interest goes
to the slayer and a one-sixth interest to the other joint tenant, as well as
one-sixth of any additional profits from the property."2 Subsection (c)
merely provides that the statute will not interfere with any prior agree-
ments or resulting trusts between the parties.
(ALTERNATIVE B) SECTION 6. JOINT TENANCIES, JOINT OWNERS, AND JOINT
OBLIGEES. As to property held by the slayer and the decedent as joint
tenants, joint owners, or joint obligees, the resulting death of the decedent
caused by the slayer thereby effects a severance of the interest of the
decedent, so that the share of the decedent passes as his property and the
slayer has no rights of survivorship.6 3
Again, the theory of severance of the jointly held property is the position
advocated by the UPC. The theory of severance presents no problem in this
situation, as jointly held property may be severed at any time. Bradley v.
Fox 4 followed this theory and the position of the court is stated as follows:
One of the implied conditions of the contract is that neither party will acquire
the interest of the other by murder. It is fundamental that four coexisting
unities are necessary and requisite to the creation and continuance of a joint
tenancy; namely, unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time, and unity of
possession. Any act of a joint tenant which destroys any of these unities
operates as a severance of the joint tenancy and extinguishes the right of
survivorship.11
Thus, the court held that the husband, who had killed his wife, lawfully
retained only the title to his undivided one-half interest in the property as
a tenant in common with the heir at law of his deceased wife. The court
added further in response to the forfeiture issue on constitutional grounds
that "[t]here can be no forfeiture of that which the murderer never had."6
(ALTERNATIVE C) SECTION 6. JOINT TENANTS, JOINT OWNERS, AND JOINT
OBLIGEES. As to property held by the slayer and the decedent as joint
tenants, joint owners, or joint obligees, the slayer shall be treated as having
predeceased the decedent, and the entire property shall pass to the estate
of the decedent. As to property held jointly by three or more persons,
including the slayer and the decedent, any enrichment which would have
accrued to the slayer as a result of the death of the decedent shall pass to
the estate of the decedent. If the slayer becomes the final survivor, the
62. Wade, supra note 12, at 735, n. 72.
63. UPC § 2-803(b).
64. 7 Ill.2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
65. Id. at 705-06.
66. Id. at 706.
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entire property shall pass to the estate of the decedent.
The same arguments that were expounded in Section 5, Alternative C,
are applicable here. Again, this choice seems most appropriate in situa-
tions where the slayer commits suicide after killing the spouse or joint
tenant. 7
In conclusion regarding the sections covering tenancy by the entirety and
property held jointly, perhaps the following statements are appropriate:
The public need for judicial definition and clarification of the law on this
subject is clear and compelling. If one spouse, foreseeing an impending sepa-
ration, and partition of property acquired during marriage, may secure the
entire ownership of all property held jointly with survivorship by murdering
his spouse, this alternative may be elected rationally by some. . . .one may
prevent losing one-half of the joint marital property by murdering his spouse
and, even if convicted of such crime, be free in several years to enjoy posses-
sion of his illgotten wealth.68
As one court has aptly stated, "I am opposed to subscribing to any doctrine
of law that will offer a premium to husbands to kill their wives."6 9
SECTION 7. REVERSIONS AND VESTED REMAINDERS. Property in which the
slayer holds a reversion or vested remainder and would have obtained the
right of present possession upon the death of the decedent shall pass to the
estate of the decedent during the period of the life expectancy of the dece-
dent if he held the particular estate, or if the particular estate is held by a
third person and measured by the life of the decedent, it shall remain in
the possession of the third person during the period of the life expectancy
of the decedent.
This is reminiscent of the life tenant-remainderman situation discussed
above in Blanks v. Jiggetts,7' and would have offered a better solution than
that which was obtained. The slayer should not be prohibited from acquir-
ing his remainder or reversion, since that had previously vested in him and
to deny him this would be unconstitutional. Professor Wade suggests that
67. See generally: Whitfield v. Flaherty, 228 Cal. App.2d 753, 39 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1964); In
re Estate of Bobula, 25 App. Div.2d 241, 269 N.Y.S.2d 599, rev'd on other grounds 19 N.Y.2d
818, 280 N.Y.S.2d 152, 227 N.E.2d 49 (1966). See also Sikora v. Sikora, 499 P.2d 808 (Mont.
1972).
68. Jackson v. Morrison, No. 781405 (Sup. Ct. of Va., writ granted Feb. 2, 1979), Petition
for Appeal at 13.
69. In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N.Y.S. 116, 118 (1925).
70. WADE Statute, § 7 at 735; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8807 (Purdon 1975); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31A-7 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The UPC does not expressly provide for this situation.
71. 192 Va. 337, 64 S.E.2d 809 (1951). See note 4, supra.
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the mortality tables must be used to cover this situation. The Restatement
of Restitution is in accord with this provision as the following comment
illustrates:
Where a remainderman murders the life tenant and thereby accelerates the
enjoyment of his interest, he can be compelled to hold his interest upon a
constructive trust for the estate of the life tenant to the extent of the life
expectancy of the life tenant at the time when the murder was committed. 2
The proposed statute may refer to the appropriate mortality tables which
shall apply, if so desired.
SECTION 8. INTERESTS DEPENDENT ON SURVIVORSHIP OR CONTINUANCE OF
LIFE. Any interest in property, whether vested or not, held by the slayer
subject to be divested, diminished in any way or extinguished if the dece-
dent survives him or lives to a certain age, shall be held by the slayer
during his lifetime or until the decedent would have reached such age, but
shall then pass as if the decedent had died immediately after the death of
the slayer or the reaching of such age.73
Professor Wade wanted to resolve all doubts against the slayer in this
section, and it will be presumed that the decedent would have lived to have
survived the slayer or at least to have reached a certain age.
SECTION 9. CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND FUTURE INTERESTS. As to any
contingent remainder or executory or other future interest held by the
slayer subject to become vested in him or increased in any way for him
upon the condition of the death of the decedent:
(1) If the interest would not have become vested or increased if he had
predeceased the decedent, he shall be deemed to have so predeceased the
decedent;
(2) In any case, the interest shall not be vested or increased during the
period of the life expectancy of the decedent.74
Professor Wade anticipated that this section was general enough to cover
every type of future interest in this type of situation. 5 Subsection (1) is
self-explanatory. Subsection (2) covers the situation of interests which are
not contingent upon the slayer's surviving the victim, and which would
vest in the heirs of the slayer on the death of the decedent, even though
72. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188, comment c (1937).
73. WADE Statute, § 8 at 737; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8808 (Purdon 1975); N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 31A-9 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The UPC does not expressly provide for this situation.
74. WADE Statute, § 9 at 738; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8809 (Purdon 1975); N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 31A-8 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The UPC does not expressly provide for this situation.
75. Wade, supra note 12, at 738.
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the slayer is also dead. This subsection prevents those inheriting through
the slayer from acquiring any interest during the period of the decedent's
life expectancy. The Restatement of Restitution goes a step further and
provides that the murderer may be forced to surrender his whole interest:
if the murderer's interest was contingent upon his surviving the life tenant,
he might have received nothing except for the murder, since there is no way
of ascertaining with certainty whether he would have survived his victim. In
such a case, therefore, the murderer can be compelled to surrender his whole
interest, and can be compelled to hold it upon a constructive trust. He can
be compelled to hold it upon a constructive trust for the estate of the life
tenant during the life expectancy of the life tenant at the time of the murder,
and subject thereto for the person who would have been entitled in remainder
if the murderer had predeceased his victim.7 6
SEcTION 10. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT. (a) As to any exercise in the will
of the decedent of a power of appointment in favor of the slayer, the slayer
shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent and the appointment
to have lapsed.
(b) Property held either presently or in remainder by the slayer subject
to be divested by the exercise by the decedent of a power of revocation or
a general power of appointment shall pass to the estate of the decedent;
and property so held by the slayer subject to be divested by the exercise
by the decedent of a power of appointment to a particular person or persons
or to a class of persons shall pass to such person or persons or in equal
shares to the members of such class of persons, exclusive of the slayer.77
Under subsection (a), since the will becomes operative only upon the
death of the victim, the slayer may constitutionally be prohibited from
acquiring the property as he had not previously been awarded anything
which was later forfeited. Professor Wade noted, however, that any exer-
cise by the decedent of a power of appointment in an instrument which
was operative before the decedent's death could not be affected by this
section. 8
The first half of subsection (b) covers powers of revocation which indi-
cates that since the slayer has denied the decedent the privilege of exercis-
ing this power, then it will be assumed that the decedent would have
exercised this power. Furthermore, since the decedent had a general power
of appointment, it will also be assumed that he would have appointed to
76. RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUT15N § 188, comment c (1937).
77. WADE Statute, § 10 at 739; 20 PA. CoNsT. STAT. ANN. § 8810 (Purdon 1975); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31A-10 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The UPC does not expressly provide for this situation.
78. Wade, supra note 12, at 740.
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himself. For both of these reasons, the property will go to the decedent's
estate. The second half of subsection (b) covers cases in which the decedent
held a power of appointment either to a particular person or to a class of
persons. Professor Wade favored the assumption that the decedent would
have exercised this power in favor of every person except the slayer."
SECTION 11. PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE AND BONA FIDE PAYMENT BY INSURANCE
COMPANY OR OBLIGOR. (a) Insurance proceeds payable to the slayer as the
beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insurance or bond or
other contractual agreement on the life of the decedent or as the survivor
of a joint life policy shall be paid to the estate of the decedent, unless the
policy or certificate designates some person not claiming through the slayer
as alternative beneficiary to him.
(b) If the decedent is beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate
of insurance on the life of the slayer, the proceeds shall be paid to the estate
of the decedent upon the death of the slayer, unless the policy names some
person other than the slayer or his estate as alternative beneficiary, or
unless the slayer, by naming a new beneficiary or by assigning the policy,
performs an act which would have deprived the decedent of his interest in
the policy if he had been living.
(c) No insurance company shall be subject to liability on any policy on
the life of the decedent procured and maintained by the slayer or on which
all the premiums were paid by him.
(d) Any insurer making payment according to the terms of its policy or
contract or any bank or other person performing an obligation for the slayer
as one of several joint obligees shall not be subjected to additional liability
by the terms of this section if such payment or performance is made with-
out notice of circumstances bringing it within the provisions of this sec-
tion. "0
Professor Wade indicated that subsection (a) was merely inserted as a
codification of the common law.' This same conclusion was reached by the
79. Wade, supra note 12, at 741, n.84.
80. WADE Statute, § 11 at 741; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 8811, 8812 (Purdon 1975);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-11 (Repl. Vol. 1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (Repl. Vol. 1973); UPC
§ 2-803(c) and (f). The RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION position is as follows:
(1) If the beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the insured, he holds his
interest under the policy upon a constructive trust for the estate of the insured.
(2) If the beneficiary of a life insurance policy in which the insured has not reserved
power to change the beneficiary is murdered by the insured, the latter holds his interest
under the policy upon a constructive trust for the estate of the beneficiary.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 189.
81. Wade, supra note 12, at 742.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Life
Insurance Company of Virginia v. Cashatt2 in which the court stated:
There can be no doubt that the general rule, followed probably universally,
is that a beneficiary of an insurance policy who kills the insured by murder
or voluntary manslaughter cannot take the proceeds of the policy. This is
because of the ancient common law doctrine that no man shall be allowed
to profit by his own wrong."
It has been suggested that "the single most important asset involved in
intrafamilial homicide is life insurance.""4 Because of the strength of the
common law, "many courts which have held that, in the absence of a
statute, a murderer must be allowed to inherit, have nonetheless held that
'a murderer cannot collect insurance proceeds."'" The present Virginia stat-
ute, section 64.1-18, is responsive to most of the questions arising in the
life insurance situation, and the proposed statute is made intentionally
broad to cover any possible situations which may not be clarified under
section 64.1-18, and it also removes the requirement of conviction of mur-
der which presently exists. Section 3, discussed earlier, provides a solution
to the situation which might occur when the slayer is the sole or chief heir
of the estate of the decedent. That section provides that no slayer will be
allowed to inherit from the victim's estate.
The situation occurring when the insured kills the beneficiary is pro-
vided for in subsection (b). Since this would cause the insured's estate to
profit, this result is prohibited.
Professor Wade acknowledged the fact that subsection (c) was optional,
as most courts would declare the policy to be void even in the absence of
this provision." This section also would prohibit the slayer from being
entitled to the cash surrender value of the policy or a return of the prem-
iums.
Subsection (d) is taken basically from the last sentence of the current
section 64.1-18. This writer has suggested the addition of the words "or any
bank or other person performing an obligation for the slayer as one of
several joint obligees" and the words "or performance." The words were
taken from Section 12 of the Wade Statute and were added to this section
for the sake of brevity and conciseness. It is interesting to note that section
82. 206 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Va. 1962).
83. Id. at 411.
84. McGovern, supra note 11, at 78.
85. Id.
86. Wade, supra note 12, at 748.
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12 of the Wade Statute, with the exception of these noted words, reads
almost exactly like the last sentence of section 64.1-18.
- SECTION 12. PERSONS ACQUIRING FROM SLAYER PROTECTED. The provisions
of this Chapter shall not affect the right of any person who, before the
interests of the slayer have been adjudicated, acquires from the slayer for
adequate consideration property or an interest therein which the slayer
would have received except for the terms of this Chapter, provided the
same is acquired without notice of circumstances tending to bring it within
the provisions of this Chapter; but all consideration received by the slayer
shall be held by him in trust for the persons entitled to the property under
the provisions of this Chapter, and the slayer shall also be liable both for
any portion of such consideration which he may have dissipated, and for
any difference between the actual value of the property and the amount
of such consideration.87
Generally in this section, the innocent acquirer of the slayer's ill-gotten
bounty is protected. The Wade Statute, the Pennsylvania Statute, and the
UPC8 all use the words "purchases [from the slayer] for value and with-
out notice." In the opinion of this writer, use of the words "acquires...
for adequate consideration" and "without notice" will cover a broader
number of situations and thus should prove more satisfactory.
SECTION 13. RECORD DETERMINING SLAYER ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The
record of the judicial proceeding in which the slayer was determined to be
such, pursuant to Section 1 of this Chapter, shall be admissible in evidence
for or against a claimant of property in any civil action arising under this
Chapter. A conviction shall be conclusive evidence of the guilt of the al-
leged slayer.8'
Professor Wade noted that this section was optional. This section merely
provides for evidentiary certainty in any subsequent civil proceedings. The
UPC advocates the position that a conviction shall be conclusive evidence
of the guilt of the slayer.
SECTION 14. BROAD CONSTRUCTION. This Chapter shall not be considered
penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy
of this Commonwealth that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own
wrong, wherever committed."0
87. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-12 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
88. WADE Statute, § 13 at 749; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8813 (Purdon 1975); UPC § 2-
803(f).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-13 (Repl. Vol. 1976); UPC § 2-803(e).
90. WADE Statute, § 15 at 750; 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8815 (Purdon 1975). The words




There is a great need for this section in the proposed statute. Experience
in Virginia has shown us that courts have regarded section 64.1-18 and its
predecessor, section 64-18, as a penal statute, and thus it has been strictly
and narrowly construed. "The reason the son is allowed the benefit of the
shortened life estate is because the statute does not prohibit it. Code,
section 64-18 is a penal law, divesting a person of rights otherwise accorded
him under the law, and it must be strictly construed."" Professor Wade
emphasized the fact that "this Act is not really penal, since nothing that
the slayer has is taken away from him; he is merely prevented from
acquiring property as a result of his having killed the decedent-this in
pursuit of a principle equitable in its nature rather than penal. '9 2
SECTION 15. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT NOT APPLICABLE. The
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, sections 64.1-97 to 64.1-104, shall not
apply to cases governed by this Chapter. 3
This section is to prevent any of the presumptions arising under the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act from conflicting with any of the provi-
sions of the proposed statute. Just as it was provided that the Virginia anti-
lapse statute, section 64.1-64, would not apply to this statute, so it is
provided that the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act shall not apply.
SECTION 16. SEVERABILITY CLAUSE. If any provision of this Chapter or the
application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Chapter
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and
to this end the provisions of this Chapter are declared to be severable. 4
This provision is optional, but is inserted merely to serve as a severabil-
ity clause ensuring the validity of the Chapter if any section is held to be
invalid.
Im. CONCLUSION
It is anticipated that this proposed statute will cover any potential situa-
tions which might arise in this area of the law. In spite of its length which
is necessary to cover such broad ground, it should serve as a workable
solution to meet the present inadequacies of section 64.1-18. Perhaps by
91. Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 342, 64 S.E.2d 809 (1951) [emphasis added]. The court
in Sykes v. Shelia, mem. op. (Cir. Ct. of Russell Co., Va. 1975) also stated that the "Code of
Virginia must be strictly construed."
92. Wade, supra note 12, at 751.
93. N.C. GEN STAT. § 31A-14 (Repl. Vol. 1976); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-97 to 104 (Repl.
Vol. 1973).
94. WADE Statute, § 16 at 751.
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adopting this proposed staiute, the General Assembly could offer the
courts of Virginia a solution to the problems they face in cases involving
homicide and succession. Then no judge in Virginia would be faced with
the situation that New York Judge Earl was confronted with in the early
case of Riggs v. Palmer.5
The good judge then proceeded to review the various ancient maxims of
the law, including one of the oldest: "No man shall profit by his own wrong."
He quoted Blackstone; he quoted Coke; he drew upon the Code Napoleon;
he even quoted Aristotle in Latin. One suspects that had Aristotle been a
Roman, he would have quoted him in Greek. But the erudite judge was in a
bit of a fix. For the plain truth of the matter was that the floundering Judge
Earl had very little exact precedent to go on. This strange case was a new
kettle of fish. Yet it is clear from his opinion that the judge was revolted...
by the notion that a murderer could inherit under the will of the man he had
murdered; he was struggling to deny him if he could, even if he had to quote
from the old cookbookY9
No longer should the judges of Virginia have to resort to a statute which
does not totally reflect the public policy of the Commonwealth, namely,
that no man shall profit by his wrongful act.
Sandra Gross Schneider
95. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 118 (1889). The court, in this case, found it necessary to read a
judge-made exception into the Statute of Wills of New York to prevent a murderer from
receiving benefits under his murdered uncle's will. Comment, Decedent's Estates-
Forfeitures of Property Rights by Slayers, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 448, 465 (1976).





WILFUL AND UNLAWFUL KILLING OF DECEDENT
SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF TERMS. As used in this section:
(1) "Slayer" shall mean any person who participates, either as a princi-
pal or as an accessory before the fact, in the wilful and unlawful killing of
any other person.
(2) "Decedent" shall mean any person whose life is so taken.
(3) "Property" shall include any real and personal property and any
right or interest therein.
SECTION 2. SLAYER NOT TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY AS A RE-
SULT OF SLAYING. Neither the slayer nor any person claiming through
him shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefits as the
result of the death of the decedent, but such property shall pass as pro-
vided in the sections following.
SECTION 3. DESCENT, DISTRIBUTION, DOWER, CURTESY,
AND STATUTORY RIGHTS AS SURVIVOR. The slayer shall be
deemed to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have
passed from the estate of the decedent to the slayer under the statutes of
descent and distribution or which would have been acquired by dower, by
curtesy, or by statutory right as surviving spouse.
SECTION 4. DEVISE OR LEGACY. The slayer shall be deemed to
have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed to
the slayer by devise or legacy from the decedent, except that § 64.1-64,
preventing lapse of devise or legacies when the person named in the will
dies before the testator, shall not apply.
SECTION 5. (ALTERNATIVE A) TENANCIES BY THE
ENTIRETY. One half of the property held by the slayer and the decedent
shall pass upon the death of the decedent to his estate, and the other half
shall be held by the slayer during his life subject to pass upon his death to
the estate of the decedent.
SECTION 5. (ALTERNATIVE B) TENANCIES BY THE
ENTIRETY. As to property held by the slayer and the decedent as tenants
by the entirety, the resulting death of the decedent caused by the slayer
thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share
of the decedent passes as his property and the slayer has no rights of
survivorship.
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SECTION 5. (ALTERNATIVE C) TENANCIES BY THE
ENTIRETY. As to property held by the slayer and the decedent as tenants
by the entirety, the slayer shall be treated as having predeceased the
decedent, and the entire property shall pass to the estate of the decedent.
SECTION 6. (ALTERNATIVE A) JOINT TENANTS, JOINT
OWNERS, AND JOINT OBLIGEES.
(a) One half of any property held by the slayer and the decedent as joint
tenants, joint owners, or joint obligees shall pass upon the death of the
decedent to his estate, and the other half shall pass to his estate upon the
death of the slayer, unless the slayer obtains a separation or severance of
the property or a decree granting partition.
(b) As to property held jointly by three or more persons, including the
slayer and the decedent, any enrichment which would have accrued to the
slayer as a result of the death of the decedent shall pass to the estate of
the decedent. If the slayer becomes the final survivor, one half of the
property shall immediately pass to the estate of the decedent, and the
other half shall pass to his estate upon the death of the slayer, unless the
slayer obains a separation or severance of the property or a decree granting
partition.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not affect any enforceable agree-
ment between the parties or any trust arising because a greater proportion
of the property has been contributed by one party than by the other.
SECTION 6. (ALTERNATIVE B) JOINT TENANCIES, JOINT
OWNERS, AND JOINT OBLIGEES. As to property held by the slayer
and the decedent as joint tenants, joint owners, or joint obligees, the slayer
shall be treated as having predeceased the decedent, and the entire prop-
erty shall pass to the estate of the decedent. As to property held jointly by
three or more persons, including the slayer and the decedent, any enrich-
ment which would have accrued to the slayer as a result of the death of
the decedent shall pass to the estate of the decedent. If the slayer becomes
the final survivor, the entire property shall pass to the estate of the dece-
dent.
SECTION 7. REVERSIONS AND VESTED REMAINDERS. Prop-
erty in which the slayer holds a reversion or vested remainder and would
have obtained the right of present possession upon the death of the dece-
dent shall pass to the estate of the decedent during the period of life
expectancy of the decedent if he held the particular estate, or if the partic-
ular estate is held by a third person and measured by the life of the
decedent, it shall remain in the possession of the third person during the
period of the life expectancy of the decedent.
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SECTION 8. INTERESTS DEPENDENT ON SURVIVORSHIP OR
CONTINUANCE OF LIFE. Any interest in property, whether vested or
not, held by the slayer subject to be divested, diminished in any way or
extinguished if the decedent survives him or lives to a certain age, shall
be held by the slayer during his lifetime or until the decedent would have
reached such age, but shall then pass as if the decedent had died immedi-
ately after the death of the slayer or the reaching of such age.
SECTION 9. CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND FUTURE
INTERESTS. As to any contingent remainder or executory or other future
interest held by the slayer subject to become vested in him or increased in
any way for him upon the condition of the death of the decedent:
(1) If the interest would not have become vested or increased if he had
predeceased the decedent, he shall be deemed to have so predeceased the
decedent;
(2) In any case, the interest shall not be vested or increased during the
period of the life expectancy of the decedent.
SECTION 10. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT.
(a) As to any exercise in the will of the decedent of a power of appoint-
ment in favor of the slayer, the slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased
the decedent and the appointment to have lapsed.
(b) Property held either presently or in remainder by the slayer subject
to be divested by the exercise by the decedent of a power of revocation or
a general power of appointment shall pass to the estate of the decedent;
and property so held by the slayer subject to be divested by the exercise
by the decedent of a power of appointment to a particular person or persons
or to a class of persons shall pass to such person or persons or in equal
shares to the members of such class of persons, exclusive of the slayer.
SECTION 11. PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE AND BONA FIDE
PAYMENT BY INSURANCE COMPANY OR OBLIGOR.
(a) Insurance proceeds payable to the slayer as the beneficiary or as-
signee of any policy or certificate of insurance or bond or other contractual
agreement on the life of the decedent or as the survivor of a joint life policy
shall be paid to the estate of the decedent, unless the policy or certificate
designates some person not claiming through the slayer as alternative ben-
eficiary to him.
(b) If the decedent is beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate
of insurance on the life of the slayer, the proceeds shall be paid to the estate
of the decedent upon the death of the slayer, unless the policy names some
person other than the slayer or his estate as alternative beneficiary, or
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unless the slayer, by naming a new beneficiary or by assigning the policy,
performs an act which would have deprived the decedent of his interest in
the policy if he had been living.
(c) No insurance company shall be subject to liability on any policy on
the life of the decedent procured and maintained by the slayer or on which
all the premiums were paid by him.
(d) Any insurer making payment according to the terms of its policy or
contract or any bank or other person performing an obligation for the slayer
as one of several joint obligees shall not be subjected to additional liability
by the terms of this section if such payment or performance is made with-
out notice of circumstances bringing it within the provisions of this section.
SECTION 12. PERSONS ACQUIRING FROM SLAYER
PROTECTED. The provisions of this Chapter shall not affect the right
of any person who, before the interests of the slayer have been adjudicated,
acquires from the slayer for adequate consideration property or an interest
therein which the slayer would have received except for the terms of this
Chapter, provided the same is acquired without notice of circumstances
tending to bring it within the provisions of this Chapter; but all considera-
tion received by the slayer shall be held by him in trust for the persons
entitled to the property under the provisions of this Chapter, and the slayer
shall also be liable both for any portion of such consideration which he may
have dissipated, and for any difference between the actual value of the
property and the amount of such consideration.
SECTION 13. RECORD DETERMINING SLAYER ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE. The record of the judicial proceeding in which the slayer
was determined to be such, pursuant to Section 1 of this Chapter, shall be
admissible in evidence for or against a claimant of property in any civil
action arising under this Chapter. A conviction shall be conclusive evi-
dence of the guilt of the alleged slayer.
SECTION 14. BROAD CONSTRUCTION. This Chapter shall not be
considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect
the policy of this Commonwealth that no person shall be allowed to profit
by his own wrong, wherever committed.
SECTION 15. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT NOT
APPLICABLE. The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, § § 64.1-97 to 64.1-
104, shall not apply to cases governed by this Chapter.
SECTION 16. SEVERABILITY CLAUSE. If any provision of this
Chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of
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the Chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this Chapter are declared to
be severable.

